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Abstract 
 
Standardized tests were initially sold as a meritocratic way to determine college admission (Grodsky et al. 2008). 
However, standardized tests have come under increasing scrutiny. First, these tests are poor predictors of student 
performance (Hoffman and Lowitzki, 2005; Nettles et al., 2003). Second, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, students 
from lower SES (Socioeconomic Status) households and minority students score lower on standardized tests 
(Blau, Moller, and Jones, 2004; Camara and Schmidt, 1999; Freedle, 2003). Therefore, to attract a more diverse 
student body, many four-year colleges have switched to test-optional admissions policies. Though these policies 
vary by institution, most test-optional admissions policies do not require students to submit their test scores when 
applying to college (FairTest: The National Center for Fair and Open Testing, 2019). If these institutions are 
successful at attracting more lower SES students without altering the prices of attendance, the test-optional 
student body may accumulate more debt. Alternatively, these low SES students may receive more scholarship or 
financial support. 
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BACKGROUND
Standardized tests were initially sold as a meritocratic way to 
determine college admission (Grodsky et al. 2008). However, 
standardized tests have come under increasing scrutiny. First, 
these tests are poor predictors of student performance 
(Hoffman and Lowitzki, 2005; Nettles et al., 2003). Second, 
as shown in Figures 1 and 2, students from lower SES 
(Socioeconomic Status) households and minority students 
score lower on standardized tests (Blau, Moller, and Jones, 
2004; Camara and Schmidt, 1999; Freedle, 2003). 
Therefore, to attract a more diverse student body, many four-
year colleges have switched to test-optional admissions 
policies. Though these policies vary by institution, most test-
optional admissions policies do not require students to 
submit their test scores when applying to college (FairTest: 
The National Center for Fair and Open Testing, 2019). 
Figure 1
METHODS
We use a difference-in-difference (DiD) method to investigate 
the relationship between test-optional policies on student 
loan debt. As shown in Figure 3, a difference-in-difference 
regression uses within-college (institution-level) variation in 
student-loan debt to empirically isolate the test-optional 
effect on student debt. We weight our results by enrollment 
so that schools with larger student bodies have higher 
weights than those with smaller student bodies. We lag the 
graduate debt measures so that our results give us the debt 
of graduates who were admitted under a test-optional 
admissions policy. Additionally, for some specifications, we 
include institution fixed effects, year fixed effects, and 
institution-specific time trends. We also control for the 
percent of full-time freshman who received any financial aid, 
the percent of students admitted to an institution, the 
average salary of full-time instructional faculty, and the total 
price for in-state students living on campus.
Figure 3 RESULTS
Our results, shown in Figure 5, reveal that when an 
institution switches to a test-optional admissions policy, the 
share of graduates with debt decreases by three percentage 
points (Column 2). However, graduate borrowers admitted 
under the test-optional policy owe $1,316 (Column 3) more 
than those who were required to submit their test scores. 
When we include institution-specific trends, as in columns 4 
and 5, we observe a similar relationship, but the results are 
no longer precisely estimated. Results are also less robust 
when institutional controls are included, although debt is 
still higher for test-optional admits.
To investigate whether our findings hold for public and 
private four-year institutions separately, we repeat the 
exercise above using public and private subsamples. Our 
results for public and private schools, not shown, reveal that 
public school students borrow more when an institution 
switches to a test-optional policy. For example, when 
including all controls, except institution-specific trends (as 
similar to column 7), public school graduates borrow $2,100 
more when admitted under a test-optional policy. As above, 
the results are not precisely estimated once institutional 
specific trends are included. We do not find statistically 
significant results when looking at private universities and 
colleges. 
We find similar results for the average freshman loan debt 
and share of freshman loan debt. When an institution 
switches to a test-optional admissions policy, the share of 
freshman with debt decreases by three percentage points 
on average, but freshman admitted under the test-optional 
admissions policy owe $243 more on average than those 
who were required to submit their test scores. This lower 
debt magnitude is to be expected because freshman only 
incur one year of debt, where graduates have accumulated 
up to six years of debt.
CONCLUSIONS
We find that students admitted under test-optional 
admissions policies graduate with more debt than students 
admitted under test-required admissions policies. However, 
we also find that a smaller fraction of graduates borrow 
under test-optional admissions. These effects are larger in 
absolute magnitude for public schools than for private 
schools. These results suggest that the variance in actual 
prices paid by students may increase when a school 
switches to a test-optional admissions program. Further 
research into the relationship between test-optional policies 
and need-blind admissions on student debt will shed light 
on potential explanations of increasing student debt.
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If these institutions are successful at attracting more lower 
SES students without altering the prices of attendance, the 
test-optional student body may accumulate more debt. 
Alternatively, these low SES students may receive more 
scholarship or financial support. 
Figure 2
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 Column 8 Column 9
VARIABLES Graduates with Debt (%)
Graduates Debt 
($)
Graduates with 
Debt (%)
Graduates Debt 
($)
Graduates with 
Debt (%)
Graduates Debt 
($)
Graduates with 
Debt (%)
Graduates Debt 
($)
Test Optional -0.0298*** 1,316** -0.00463 670.9 -0.0167 1,113* -0.00604 917.2
(0.0107) (515.8) (0.0134) (881.8) (0.0106) (593.5) (0.0127) (701.0)
Observations 10,246 10,174 10,246 10,174 7,572 7,514 7,572 7,514
R-squared 0.805 0.784 0.883 0.867 0.835 0.815 0.906 0.894
Std. Errors Clustered By Institution Institution Institution Institution Institution Institution Institution Institution
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Institution FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Overall Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Institution Specific Trends NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Enrollment Weighted YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Controls NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DATA
Data on student debt come from The Institute for College 
Access & Success. Information on when colleges switch to a 
test-optional admissions policy come from The National 
Center for Fair and Open Testing. Additional institutional 
characteristics come from the National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES). Figure 4 shows the number of four-year 
institutions that switch to test optional admissions policies 
each year and the average debt of borrowers by graduating 
class for graduates of public and private schools.
Figure 4
Figure 5 
GOALS
• Test whether test-optional admissions policies alter 
student loan debt by using a difference-in-difference 
model. 
• Determine if the correlation holds across various 
measures of student loan debt.
• Investigate whether the test-optional, student debt 
relationship is similar for public and private school 
students.
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